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This paper attempts to look inside the black box of social capital by
developing micro-models of the value of contacts, and then re-assess the
empirical literature as to which sources of productive value are relevant
in diﬀerent stages of development. We identify 4 sources of the value of
contacts: depreciation of indivisible intermediaries, economies of scale in
information gathering, comparative advantage, and discount rates in the
presence of indivisible intermediaries. We argue that economies of scale
in information and the presence of discount rates are more relevant to the
value of social contacts in developed economies while comparative advan-
tage and depreciation are more likely to be important components of the
value of contacts in developing economies.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The literature on social capital is emerging as one of the new ﬁelds of economics.
Two diﬀerent things have been meant by social capital. One is a measure of
contacts, termed the ‘size of the rolodex’ by Putnam (2000) and Glaeser et
al. (2002). Another is the set of community ties and expectations that make
contact-making itself easier and cheaper. This includes notions of trust, informal
networks, and adherence to community norms (Bowles and gintis 2002; also
Sobel 2002). The underpinning of both notions of social capital is that contacts
have positive production eﬀects. The main empirical ‘fact’ in this literature has
indeed been that the number of contacts of an individual, ﬁrm, household, or
village, has a strong positive eﬀect on measures of output such as wages and an
ability to absorb shocks (Grootaert et al. 2002; Maluccio et al. 2000; Westlund
and Bolton 2003; Wilson 2000; Winn 2002). This ‘prima facie’ evidence is then
used to advocate policies that strengthen social capital.
The purpose of this paper is to help connect the social capital development
literature to micro-economics by looking at what underlies the usefulness of
contacts in terms of basic production processes. By contacts I will invariably
mean the coordination of output decisions: having K contacts will mean that K
persons can instantaneously and costlessly coordinate what they produce. This
means contacts incorporate the notion of input-output relations and worker-job
matches. I start from a benchmark representative agent growth model (the
Swan-Solow model and its modern counterparts) in which contacts play no role
at all to see what deviations one can think of that lead to a value of contacts.
2This leads to four basic production reasons for contacts to have productive
value, including increasing returns to scale due to depreciating intermediaries
(Section 2), economies of scale in information gathering (Section 3), compar-
ative advantages (Section 4), and positive, but not extremely high, discount
rates in the presence of indivisibilities (Section 5). Whilst economies of scale in
information and comparative advantage have been well-recognised hitherto as
reasons for individuals to coordinate output, we’re not aware that the literature
has so far recognised low positive discount rates and depreciation externalities
as important reasons for output coordination. In these sections, I set up simple
models of the value of contacts, and make some preliminary observations on
their relevance for diﬀerent countries and phases of development.
The recent empirical literature that has estimated the ‘eﬀect’ of social cap-
ital is re-examined in Section 6. I take all the articles estimating the value
of contacts or ‘social capital’ that appeared in the last 5 years in the Journal
of Development Economics; ..., From each article we distill the reasons given
for why contacts should causally lead to higher output (as measured in wage,
wage growth, and consumption). As best as possible, the stated reasons are
categorised into the found 4 basic production reasons for contacts to matter.
The main result from that is that there does seem to be a basic diﬀerence be-
tween the productive value of contacts in various regions. By and large, in poor
developing countries, contacts are associated with comparative advantages and
depreciating intermediaries. In developed countries, the main beneﬁto fc o n -
tacts appears to be economies of scale in information gathering, and discount
3rates in the presence of indivisibilities (which subsume complementarities ac-
cross specialisations). The conclusions discuss how these found diﬀerences may
lead to diﬀerentiated approach to social capital promotion.
1.1 Preamble
There are many diﬀerent things meant by the term social capital in the current
state of the social capital literature. This makes it hard to evaluate the supposed
production beneﬁt of social capital. Even in the papers using formal models,
the beneﬁts of social capital usually appears in reduced form. Glaeser et al.
(2002) simply postulate an individual production function with contacts in it
without going into the deeper reasons for why contacts may be useful. There
are also endogenous growth models of development where social capital enters
an economy-wide production function in a reduced-form way (see for example
the working papers by Grafton et al (2004) or Frijters et al. (2003)). One thus
gets to see a reduced-form production function
y = f(L,SC)
where L would be labour and SC would be contacts, and where f0
SC(.) > 0.
These models are essentially reduced-form because they suppress the inter-
action between agents that is supposed to lead to a value of contacts. From the
perspective of representative agent macro-theory, such a role of contacts needs
more micro-underpinning, if only to get a feel for whether there may be diﬀer-
ent policy issues arising in diﬀerent circumstances. To get some handle on the
4problem, I start from the extreme opposite position of the Swan Solow model:
y = f(AL,K)
where K would be capital and A would be technology. Under the old Swan-
Solow assumptions, A changes exogenously. In more modern versions, A is
endogenous to prior investments in K (e.g. Acemoglu 2002 JEl on endogenous
skill-biased change); moves stochastically (as in the Augmented Solow Model); is
subject to shocks whose arrival rate is endogenous (as in the Neo-Shumpeterian
models); or is a reduced-form function of macro variables (like in the growth
regressions where things like R&D expenditure are plugged in). In each of these
additions though, the strict self-consistent interpretation of this is a represen-
tative agent model in which the only real interaction between agents is via
externalities on A or intertemporal trade in K.
In the stylised Swan-Solow world technology is diﬀused costlessly, and in-
dividual representative production units make a representative good combining
labour and physical capital. There is no need for any interaction between agents
in such an economy. Indeed, each productive unit simply is a separate economy
moving on the optimal production frontier. Investment arises from own savings,
which perfectly overlap with average savings and average investments. The no-
tion of contacts and social capital is meaningless in such a model. No output
coordination takes place between these representative agents. This model is an
appropriate starting place to think about what underlying production phenom-
5ena would lead to a value of output coordination.
The ﬁrst observation we make is that in order to have a value of output
coordination we need to think about production of more than one good, where
we include ‘knowledge’ as a good. What assumptions do we need to believe in
if we’d want to have the same Swan-Solow model appear valid in a world with
many diﬀerent intermediate goods that are combined into a ﬁnal good. In order
for intermediaries to be unimportant to the representative agent abstraction of
the Swan-Solow model, every production unit would have to be able to produce
each intermediary good and without any ineﬃciencies occuring in doing so. In
t h ec a s et h a to n en e e d s ,s a y ,N intermediary goods ZN to make one unit of
ﬁnal output, then the representative agent model eﬀectively presumes each pro-
duction unit could eﬃciently make a small portion of each intermediary Zn and
combine those small portions into ﬁnal output production in a constant-returns-
to-scale manner. Each unit producing all intermediaries independently in small
portions is then just as productive as units specialising in one intermediary and
trading them with others. We can make a preliminary taxonomy of what the
potential value could be of having contacts by simply thinking of the possible
deviations of this benchmark:
1. Some indivisible intermediaries may be subject to constant depreciation,
making it impossible to simultaneously produce many intermediaries as an
individual unit, making output coordination proﬁtable and thus contacts
valuable. This partially underlies the productive aspect of public goods,
whose production needs output coordination and thus contacts.
62. Having more contacts makes it possible to have faster technological progress
when contacts allow one to avoid duplication of information gathering. Co-
ordinating production, including the production of knowledge, then makes
those with more contacts more likely to know more eﬃcient way to pro-
duce from given inputs. This is the positive externality (public goods)
aspect of knowledge.
3. There is heterogeneity in basic talents for making intermediaries, implying
the existence of comparative advantages and a gains for trade leading to
a value of having trading partners (contacts).
4. Some indivisible intermediaries may take an individual unit a long time to
make, which leads to a long period of investment in intermediary produc-
tion before an individual unit could combine all necessary intermediaries
in ﬁnal good production. The presence of discounting then gives rise to a
beneﬁt of output coordination and a value of contacts.
I attempt to show at various stages that these 4 simple basic production
mechanisms subsume all the usually stated reasons for why contacts may have
productive value at the level of an individual production unit. These include
‘market access’, ‘insurance’, ‘network economies of scale’, and cognitive limita-
tions of individuals. I will introduce each of these 4 basic reasons in stylised
examples so as to make these reasons as concrete as possible, after which the
general principle embedded in the example is brought out.
71.2 Remark: network economies
A lot of recent attention has gone to the economies of scale inherent in networks
(see Melecki 2000). The basic idea is that when K persons are connected, there
are K ∗ (K − 1) possible combinations of bilateral trade. The opportunities for
bilateral trade thus go up faster than linearly, leading to economies of scale in the
network as a whole when the costs of a new contact are linear. Note though that
this basic reasoning hides the reasons for why it is relevant that opportunities
for bilateral trade would increase non-linearly. Simply stating the non-linear
increase in opportunities is not suﬃciently precise about the basic production
processes giving rise to the advatange of having a network. It would for instance
make no diﬀerence to have all these opportunities if there were no reasons to
trade, i.e. if each person would be at the production frontier on his or her own
(Robinson Crusoe economies). It is thus in the implicit background assumptions
that the real network economies come in. A story often told is that when people
are randomly allocated complementary goods, say nuts and bolts, then being
able to trade with many others would more bring the nuts and bolts together
than if trade was with only a few people. These are eﬀectively thick-market
externalities, such as introduced in Diamon (1982). They still presume some
advantage of specialisation for otherwise individuals would simply make nuts
and bolts themselves. In a standard competitive model, like the Swan-Solow
model and its successors, none of these elements leading to network advantage
arise. It’s quite a leap from the standard competitive model in which units
produce representative goods to have a world in which some allocator ‘randomly’
8throws nuts and bolts around in the population. Hence network economies of
scale arguments needs more basic mechanisms to connect them to basic micro.
2M o d e l 1 : y o u d i g , I p u m p
Consider for the sake of concreteness a deep mine that is troubled by an constant
inﬂow of groundwater. It basically takes one person to mind the pump to keep
the mine dry. The production in this mine should it have one labourer would
thus be zero because the ﬁrst labourer would have to be spent on minding the
pump. The subsequent labourers however can then all dig in the mine, meaning
that the average productivity of labour at the mine would be
(N−1)w
N where N
is the number of labourers, and w the production of one digger per day.
Now, the essential component in this story is the fact that there is an in-
divisible intermediary good in this mine, called dryness, which is subject to
depreciation. The actual production function of the mine would thus read
yt = zt ∗ (Nt − Pt)
zt =m i n {1,P t}
where zt is the intermediary good ‘dryness’ and Pt is the allocation of
pumpers per period. More deeply, this example points to depreciation in in-
termediary production factors as a source of economies of scale. There are
many more examples than just the case of a mine subject to ﬂooding. Think of
9ﬁtting new hoofs on a horse or lifting something heavy with more than 1 person.
There too intermediate goods subject to depreciation are involved: the horse
whose hoofs need cleaning walks away if not held; the thing that needs lifting
would fall if it is not held at each of its corners by others. Arguably the most
relevant examples of depreciating intermediaries are in agriculture: irrigation
works and river damming need to be almost completely maintained if they are
to be eﬀective. This too is because an intermediary (dams and canals) depre-
ciate. There are thus a myriad of cases where intermediate production goods
(a docile horse; a thing lifted at all other corners, a dam, anything subject to
outside forces) subject to depreciation cause increasing returns to scale which
in turn leads to a value of contacts that allow production coordination. Many
public goods have such an aspect to them, though we have not seen the im-
portance of indivisible intermediaries subject to depreciation recognised as an
important component of the value of output coordination in that literature..
3 Model 2: Information externalities
If one can gain information from contacts about optimal production methods,
then this almost immediately implies a value of contacts in the situation that
knowledge heterogeneity exist. A simple micro-model to illustrate this is the
following:
blabla
104 Model 3: Comparative advantage
Suppose that there are M skills and individuals in the economy, and that person
i has a comparative advantage in the production of skill i. These comparative
advantages may come from the existence of heterogeneous innate abilities or
some other initial endownment. This will mean that the productivity per time
unit of i in skill i is 1 whereas the productivity per unit of time is only 0 <c<1
in all other skills. Let pij denote the level of consumption of person i of good







with 0 <γ < 1
Comparative advantage is for simplicity taken to be uniformly distributed
over the whole population. Hence the ’prices’ of each good in the case that
everyone could trade with each other would all be the same.
Having contacts in this example would literally mean being able to trade the
results of labour time.
Let us ﬁrst consider the time allocation an individual i would choose in the
absence of any contacts. It then holds that the time allocated to production
(denoted as tj) of goods j will be the same for all j 6= i.T a k i n gg o o dj = M 6= i
11as the reference, Utility can then be written as
Ui =( M − 1)(ctM)γ + t
γ
i
T =( M − 1)tM + ti



























If we use the prices that would arise in perfect competition as weights, then
aggregate production in autarky (thus with only one contact) would be
π(1) = (M − 1)ctM + ti = T −




If everyone is connected in this economy, then everyone would specialise
completely in their ﬁeld of comparative advantage and aggregate production
would be T. Hence π(M)=T.
Consider now the case where 1 <m<Mp e r s o n si nt h i se c o n o m ya r e
connected and these m persons would agree to the social planner allocation of
12time and consumption. For notational convenience, suppose these m persons
cover the ﬁrst m out of M skills. It would ﬁrstly clearly be suboptimal if anyone
would produce something in which one of the other (m-1) has a comparative
advantage. Thus the optimal time allocation would be for each to spend the
same amount of time ti on their individual skill of comparative advantage, and
to each spend tM on all of the (M − m) ﬁelds not covered by the group of
m connected people. The utility of the representative person would thus be
Ui = m( ti
m)γ +( M − m)(ctM)
γ . Solving for a maximum leads to
tM =
T
















π(m)=( M − m)ctM + ti = T −
(M − m)T(1 − c)





The resulting function π(m) is thus a micro-founded production function of
the value of contacts arising due to comparative advantages. Although it looks
a little cumbersome, it is quite well-behaved: it is convex and diﬀerentiable.
This means that if the costs of making contacts is linear (which is the dominant
presumption in the literature on contacts making: see Petrongolo and Pissarides
2001), there is going to be a unique optimum level of contacts persons would
make in this economy.
134.1 Submodel 3.1 Cobb-douglas utility













i.e. utility is cobb-Douglas. Following the same train of argumentation as above,














(M − m)(1 − c)T
M
which is linearly increasing in m and would thus lead to knife-edge cases for
the choice of the number of contacts with linear contact making costs.
4.2 Alternative interpretations of complementarities
It is important to realise that complementarities in production captures many
diﬀerent possibilities. Complementarities reﬂect diﬀerent initial endowments
in things people can proﬁtable combine. This ﬁts the notions of people having
complementary skills, as modelled above. It also ﬁts the possibility of individuals
being uninformed in some sense: when individuals are for instance only capable
of memorising a limited number of things then having contacts expands the
total number of things that can be remembered for a connected group, with
exactly the same property as skill complementarities.
We can go one step deeper and wonder what leads to skill complementarities
14in a world where everyone is born equal but where individuals can specialise in
diﬀerent ﬁelds. The key question in the back of ones mind is then why individu-
als don’t learn every specialisation to a limited degree and then produce or why
they don’t learn every specialisation and then produce. One can venture that
one must know almost everything about a ﬁeld before one is truly capable of
producing a speciﬁc intermediary (which itself reﬂects a complementarity in sub-
sub knowledge) which would be a reason why individuals don’t learn everything
to a limited degree but learn specialisations. Without discount rates however,
individuals would even then simply ﬁrst learn everything there is to know and
then produce. The presence of discount rates breaks this argument. It is the
combination of an indivisibility of knowledge and discount rates that leads to
endogenous specialisation and thus ultimately leads to skill complementarities.
This argument is formalised in the next subsection. Note though that com-
plementarities may exist even without initial diﬀerential education investments:
individuals can be diﬀerently endowed with talents and production factors be-
cause of genetics, geography, history, and many other reasons unconnected to
own time investments.
5 Model 4: discount rates and indivisible inter-
mediaries.
This examples explores the pin factory example in Adam Smith’s 1778 book the
Wealth of Nations. Adam Smith observed that a pin factory using a sophis-
15ticated machine could produce far more pins per worker than any individual
worker could achieve. He argued there were thus economies of scale in mecha-
nisation. We’re going to delve into that example somewhat deeper because the
existence of machinery per se (an intermediary complementary to labour) does
not give rise to economies of scale. An individual could namely simply ﬁrst
make a machine and then produce with that machine. One could postulate that
a worker does not have the knowledge to make a pin-making machine, which
would imply the economies of scale in machinery are related to comparative
advantage or the economies of scale in information discussed above. We will
explore whether there is another economies of scale argument associated with
the pin factory example, in the absence of comparative advantages, information
economies of scale, or even depreciation.
Suppose the production of a good, say pins, has two possible technologies.
Technology A is without intermediary goods, where a labourer spends his whole
day making pins using simple technologies. Suppose a labourer can then make
A pins per unit time.
Pin-making technology B requires the construction of a machine, which takes
T units of labour time to make. This means that a machine can be made by a
single labourer in T periods of time, or by T labourers in 1 unit of time: the
making of the machine is a constant-return to scale exercise and no-one has a
comparative advantage in making machines. That machine then instantaneously
produces P pins after which it is a write-oﬀ and a new machine has to be made.
In order to avoid uninteresting cases, we assume that TA<P which means one
16can make more pins using the second technology with the same amount of total
inputs (which is T units of labour time) than with the ﬁrst technology.
Now, suppose there are K>1i n ﬁnitely lived homogeneous labourers in this
world and that the discount rate is ρ>0.
We look at three possible ways of organising this economy, which will cover
all the eﬃcient combinations in all states of this world.
Case 1: if technology A is followed by all workers, then the total discounted
value of this pin economy equals W1(ρ)=KA
ρ .
Case 2: if technology B is followed by all workers individually (without






where pt is the production of pins in period t. Now, the optimal way for
an individual to allocate time is an optimal control problem with a very simple
solution: ﬁrst the labourer will spend T periods on making the machine, then
spend one period on making pins with the machine, then another T periods
making the new machine, etc. Hence, pt = P if t
T is an integer and pt =0





(1 + ρ)jT =
KP
(1 + ρ)T ∗
(1 + ρ)T
(1 + ρ)T − 1
Case 3: if technology B is followed by all workers under coordination, then
the optimal plan would be to have all K workers work on making one machine
17simultaneously. After that one machine is made, they work on another one.








































Now, the following proposition follows fairly directly:
Proposition 1: (i) When ρ ↓ 0, then W2
W3 goes to 1. (ii) With ρ>0,
W2
W3 < 1. (iii) When ρ>¯ ρ then W2
W1 < 1 and else W2




P .( i v ) W h e n ρ>˘ ρ>¯ ρ then W3
W1 < 1 and else W3
W1 > 1














Proof: for (i) we can note that limρ↓0
W2





















). Using l’Hopitals rule then begets our result. For (ii) we
can see that W2 is more concave than W3 which together with initial condition









1 which means they can at most have one intersection. Together
with the condition that W1(0) <W 2(0) and W1(∞) >W 2(∞) this proves (iii).
T h es a m ea r g u m e n tf o rW3 implies that W3 and W1 have one intersection, which
together with (ii) begets (iv).
The interpretation of this result is that in the presence of a very high discount
rate (higher than ˘ ρ),i ti si n e ﬃcient to specialise at all and autarky emerges
18where all use Technology A. As soon as ρ<˘ ρ then full coordination will take
place where all will use technology B. The key thing to bear in mind here is that
the supposed economies of scale of all coordinating on building a pin machine
only materialise if there is a positive low discount rate, and do not require
comparative advantages or increasing returns to scale in any basic production
technology. An empirical implication of this is that the advantages of output
coordination go up with moderate discount rates (because W2
W3 is decreasing in
ρ). If there are no discount rates at all, i.e. when ρ =0 , then individuals are
just as well oﬀ in autarky (ﬁrst making machines, then producing) as when they
fully coordinate with others.
Now, how relevant is the issue raised above going to be? The theory above
would seem to have very wide applicability because the situation that an indivis-
ible intermediary good (in this case the pin machine) only becomes productive
once it is complete, would seem to hold for virtually any piece of machinery or
intermediate production factor. Think of advertising: the add is only produc-
tive when it is ﬁnished. Think of transport: half-way is not really there. Think
of consultancy: half an advice is no advice. Think of trade negotiations: having
negotiated half a deal still means no ﬁnal deal and hence all else is still on hold;
etc. In all these cases, the fact that the intermediary is useless until complete
means that economies of scale emerge that have nothing to do with comparative
advantage or information, but with discount rates. Hence the organisation of
all industries that use these intermediaries is aﬀected by discount rates which,
paradoxically, should be positive but not extremely high because then technolo-
19gies which by-pass any intermediary become more attractive. This incidentally
also gives a reason for the break-down in specialisation in historical periods with
extremely high discount rates, such as periods of hyper-inﬂation.
The implication for theory for this model is mixed: the above story would
be a basic reason for specialisation, but the basic factors underlying them do












in them hardly make for simple closed-form solutions
of the kinds preferred in theories of trade, specialisation, etc.
What we thus advocate as a conclusion is that the argument above be used as
a ‘background micro-story’ for why specialisation and output coordination can
be production enhancing. This means they can be used as support for theories
of the ﬁrm (i.e. its a manager’s job to coordinate random labourers into pin-
machine makers), the theory of contact formation amongst homogeneous agents
(the more contacts any labourer has with any other, the more he can engage in
temporary coordination of the production of intermediaries and thus the more
productive he is). We can for instance write the average productivity of a person








K(1 + ρ)j T
K
which is increasing and convex in K, meaning that the above is a micro-
founded production function where the number of contacts of a person appears
as a positive argument. One can extend this implication by noting that in the









which is thus a linear function of K for low K, tending to a constant P
ρT
for high K (when K is of the same order as T). If we relate this productivity
to the productivity of a person working alone (when K is 1), then the ratio of
production with K (very high) co-workers to no co-workers tends to ρT which
is thus the gain from cooperation.
5.1 Example of several basic reasons combined: comple-
mentarities in production due to the arrival of random
orders.
Suppose that skills are deﬁned on a continuum [0,1], that individuals only pos-
sess one skill in which their productivity is 1 per unit of time, and that the set
of skills a representative ﬁrm i possesses is denotes by Si. Suppose further that
a ﬁrm can search directedly for skills in the population of potential workers,
and that it thus can choose Si subject to its choice of its number of workers
K. Suppose now further that each period the ﬁrm receives an order to produce,
and that the value of production this ﬁrm can oﬀer decreases quadratically in
t h ed e g r e et ow h i c hi tc a no ﬀer the skill required:
π =m a x
θ∈Si
(1 − c(O − θ)2)
21one can see the loss-function c(O − θ)2 as the number of mistakes that will
be made in production if a skill mismatch occurs, or have some similar story
about the importance of a correct match.
The problem of optimal spacing of θ i nt h ec a s eo fs u c hac o s t - f u n c t i o nh a s
been addressed previously in the literature (e.g. Van Praag and Kapteyn 1973:
the allocation is the same for any concave loss function). If we number the skills
in increasing order then a ﬁrm will opt to equally space its skill: θk = 2k−1
2K with








which is again convex in K and would thus, in the presence of constant search
costs of extra contacts, lead to a unique level of productive contacts a ﬁrm would
consist of. If one would interpret this cooperative not as a ﬁrm but as a village,
a section, or a network of friends, then the production function above gives the
aggregate production for that network size.
Note that the idea that individuals only possess one skill rather than have
them all needs a more basic productive reason. One such basic reason that
an individuals lives a ﬁnite life and that learning all specialisations requires
more than a life-time. This is at a deeper level an example of the fact that a
specialisation is indivisible (a ﬁxed minimum amount of knowledge is needed to
be a specialist) but that there is discounting, if only due to death. The value
of combining specialists is thus fundamentally due to indivisibilities combined
22with discounting.
6 Revisiting the empirical literature on the value
of contacts and social capital
This section revisits all the empirical papers published since Januari 1st 2000
in four development journals that have tried to empirically estimate the impor-
tance of contacts or social capital. The journals consulted are the Journal of
Development Economics, the Journal of Comparative Economics, Economic De-
velopment and Cultural Change, and World Development. In total, 44 papers
were found, of which 31 related to developing countries (Africa, Latin America,
and Asia) and 13 to middle-income and developed countries. 22 papers included
regression estimates of a reduced-form equation linking some output measure
(wages, village production, GDP, consumption) to a set of variables including
some measure of contacts or contact-improving ‘social capital’ (trust, commu-
nity norm, institutions). Nearly all these papers ﬁnd both contacts and the
factors making the formation and maintainance of contacts easier to be beneﬁ-
cial for the output measure at hand. What is of main interest here is the explicit
or implicit production reasons cited in those papers for the found link.
One of the main issues involved in interpreting these previous papers is how
to map statements of a particular paper into the 4 basic production mechanisms
examined above. Individual papers often give very reduced-form arguments for
why contacts should be relevant. The main two ones are ‘access to markets
23and capital’, and ‘the ability to pool risks’. These arguments are reduced-form
and we thus need to unpack them to see how they relate to basic production
processes. As a preliminary to re-interpreting the existing literature, we thus
ﬁrst need to examine what underlies the value of ‘market access’ and ‘risk-
pooling’.
6.1 How does risk-pooling ﬁti n ?
Consider the usual argument for why risk-pooling would be beneﬁcial: risk-
aversion supposedly leads to a consumption beneﬁt of being able to pool output
accross production units subjects to ideosyncratic shocks. Whilst this is un-
doubtedly true in very many situations, it does not directly imply there is a link
between the average level of output itself and the ability to pool risks. An eﬀect
on output needs a behavioural eﬀect of having risks. One can argue that in
the absence of risk-pooling mechanisms individual production units would opt
for sub-optimal production techniques that have lower expected output but also
lower variance. A variant of this argument is that individuals need a minimum
amount of calories to be functional, and that a period of particularly low produc-
tion will lower productive capacity in further periods due to body decay. Note
how both these argument relate to the basic mechanisms we already described.
The argument that body decay leads to lock-in of a particularly low-productive
year hinges on an intermediary (a body) that depreciates and thus leads to a
beneﬁt of production coordination. There is thus a link between indivisibilities
and risk-pooling when it concerns the production beneﬁts from having contacts.
24We will interpret the risk-pooling advantage of contacts (which arises mainly
in rural development settings) as belonging to the depreciating intermediary
variety.
When one thinks of what behaviour may be distorted by uninsured risks,
one can think of farmers choosing subsistence agriculture versus cash-crop agri-
culture. Such behavioural responses only seem logical however in a one-period
situation. In a longer perspective, one would think the opportunity for self-
insurance should arise, allowing an individual to escape the need to have outside
contacts for insurance. What prevents this in practise could be the inability of
an individual to store output or other reasons for abnormally low returns on
savings. It may also be due to the fact that there are other returns of scale
in alternative higher-yield production methods preventing an individual from
changing production modes. Those reasons are not really innate to risk-aversion
or risk-pooling at all though, but relate to returns of scale present in storage
devices and ﬁnancial systems. Those economies of scale in turn may lead to a
value of coordination and thus of contacts. Hence the argument on relative risks
is often a reduced-form argument that hinge on economies of scale elsewhere.
6.2 How does ‘access to markets’ ﬁti n ?
What basic production processes make access to markets relevant? Here, we
can be very direct: access to a market is in essence no diﬀerent than having
contacts. What happens on a market is the trade of time and production of
diﬀerent individuals and is thus an indirect means of production coordination.
25Having market access is thus simply equivalent to having a set of contacts. By
implications, all the basic production processes visited above are also relevant as
reasons for why ‘market access’ is important. Seen in this light, statements like
‘via migrant family members, village X has access to the transport market of the
main cities’, would be re-interpreted as ‘the spacial contacts of the villagers allow
them to take advantage of indivisibilities in transport combined with discount
rates’. What is of relevance here is that without having access to the transport
facilities of others, a village would have to buy or make an indivisible transport
devise itself, which in turn would only be used infrequently due to the limited
output of the individual village implying that discounting will make this option
less favourable than being able to infrequently hire a transport devise. In a
like manner, one can recast many statements about the presumed advantages
of contacts into our four basic mechanisms.
6.3 Categorising the found advantages of social capital in
the literature
blabla
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper had the modest goal of exploring the underlying productive advan-
tage of having contacts, understood as the ability to coordinate production. It
was shown that the value of output coordination is made up of some reasons
26well-known in micro-theory (comparative advantage, and economies of scale in
information gathering) but that there are also less obvious reasons (depreciating
intermediaries; discount rates when intermediaries are indivisible) that lead to
a value of output coordination. In each of these 4 cases, we have shown that one
can derive a resulting production function that is (quasi-)convex in the number
of contacts, implying unique levels of contacts when the costs of making con-
tacts is linear. We advocate these micro-stories as basic building blocks of more
elaborate theories of social capital.
I then re-visited the recent published development literature that has doc-
umented production beneﬁts of having contacts in various developing and de-
veloped countries. I tried to assign the reasons the authors of 44 recent papers
gave for their results into the four diﬀerent basic production circumstances that
give rise to the value of contacts.
One can wonder whether we should see any systematic diﬀerence in the
production role of contacts in diﬀerent countries. If we reﬂect on the impor-
tance of the 4 diﬀerent sources of contact value in diﬀerences countries, I’d
argue that more developed countries have more specialised productive units (in-
dividuals and ﬁrms) than less developed countries. More developed countries
already have taken up many upportunities for the use of comparative advantage
and economies of scale, whereas those factors would still seem to be important
sources of growth in less developed countries. The issue of discounting and the
existence of many specialised intermediaries that need to be linked seem the
more relevant micro-stories of contact value to think of for developed countries.
27These latter sources of contact value seem to need diﬀerent institutions than
economies of scale and comparative advantage would seem to call for. Eﬃ-
ciently linking many specialised intermediaries would seem to call for minimis-
ing volatility and maximising mass-available specialised information. Taking
advantage of economies of scale and comparative advantages would seem to call
for streightforward reductions in internal and external trade barriers. Thinking
harder about the underlying micro-sources of the value of contacts in diﬀer-
ent stages of development may thus well lead to a diﬀerentiated social capital
research agenda.
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